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Rights inSub-SaharanAfrica
Enforcing
New Property
The Ugandan Constitutionand the1998 Land Act
Sandra F Joireman

A convincing case has been made

inboth academic studies and policy circles for clear

lydefinedprivateproperty
rightsas a means toeconomicdevelopment.
Perhapsbest
workofHernandoDe Soto,well-defined
privateproperty
characterized
by therecent
rights are thought to be critical not just for economic growth, but also as tool to allevi
ate poverty.The argument that thepoor have capital thatneed only be put to efficientuse
through the creation of institutional structures thatwill allow them to access it is com
pelling. De Soto's work follows decades of policy advice provided by the international

MonetaryFund-to devel
financialinstitutions-the
WorldBank and theInternational
ofproperty,
bothinagriculture
and industry.
opingcountries
theprivatization
regarding
advicehasbeenneoliberalism.
Reformsare
The ideologicalagendabehindtheirreform
designed to facilitate trade and integration into theworld market. The focal point of De
Soto's work, in contrast, is poverty alleviation. Both perspectives suggest policy empha

sizingwell-defined
privateproperty
rightsthatcanbe bothexchangedandenforced.

Countries convinced by this theoryhave enacted legal reforms to provide an insti
tutional framework thatwill enable economic growth. These legal changes have
occurred atmultiple levels. Some countries, such as South Africa, have opted fora legal
redefinition of property in theirbasic law, at the constitutional level. Other countries,
such as Ghana, have constitutions that are sufficiently flexible to accommodate change
throughnew laws governing the articulation and regulation of property rights.A differ
ent category of countries has made changes in theirbasic law directed at other issues,
which profoundly affect property rights.One such country isRwanda, which formally
recognized women as adults in its 1991 constitution througha clause on citizen equali
ty,for the first time giving them the ability to own property and take out a mortgage in

ownname.'
their
The focus of this article will be property rights inUganda, a country thatunderwent
major constitutional reform and democratization in the 1990s. The firstpart discusses

The secondpartaddresses
theory
regarding
property
rights
andeconomicdevelopment.

property rightswith attention to the political and legal changes that have
occurred there in recent years. In the thirdpart three impediments to property rights
change-capacity, corruption, and customary law-are identified.The last part returns

Ugandan
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to the theoryand notes thediscontinuities
betweentheoretical
predictionsand the
ofnewproperty
implementation
rightsinUganda.
Two arguments will be put forth.First, theUgandan Constitution and Land Act
articulated in law the extant theory regarding the importance of private property rights.
Key components of theLand Act, such as the voluntary titling and registration of cus

of previouslyinformal
tomarylandrights,
amountto theformalization
property
rights
to land. Second, the legal changes that enabled the formalization of informal property

rightsinUganda arenecessarytoachieveinstitutional
changein landholding
practices
but insufficient on their own due to a number of impediments. These

two arguments

an analysisof thelegislation,
examination
havebeen discernedthrough
of theinstitu
thatsupportthenewprivatized
withgovernment
offi
tionalstructures
rights,
interviews
cials, and fieldwork in the capital city of Kampala

and in two regions of Uganda, Tororo

andMbarara.
Uganda

emerged from civil conflict in the late 1980s, afterwhich a reform of the

institutions
ofgovernment
began,culminating
intheratification
of a newconstitution
in
1995. The new constitution was designed

to create the framework for a functioning

electionsandbasic civil liberties.
democracy,
providingforregular
Respondingtoboth
political demand and economic necessity, Uganda used itsnew constitution to recognize
specific categories of landholding and to call for a new land law.The constitution creat
ed the legal template for the dual processes of democratization and decentralization.
These simultaneous endeavors set the context for the development of a new land law. In
the effort to create a constitution thatwould meet the needs of the country,Uganda had
a unique opportunity to address pressing issues regarding land allocation and owner
ship, problems that had festered under a series of dictatorships. Uganda is similar to
otherAfrican countries, including Ethiopia, Kenya, Ghana, and South Africa, thatwent
through the thirdwave of democratization and have attempted, not always successfully,
to capture democratic transformations in new basic law that can create an institutional
environment to sustain both democracy and economic development in the long term.

Definitionsand Caveats
The term "property rights" is used to refer to the rightsof control over an object, a piece
of land, a resource, or an idea within thebounds of the law. Specifically considered here
are property rights in land. Land tenurepatterns are a kind of property rights system or

bothlawandcustom.Institutions
referto therules
institution
thatiscontrolled
through

of the game: the patterns of behavior constructed by law, custom, or tradition and most
commonly by a combination of these.
A caveat is in order. Though this article discusses the enforcement of law and the
creation of new institutional rules regarding property rights, it should not be assumed
that law enforcement is the only solution to a state's problems. Law enforcement does
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not lead to the elimination of social ills and the establishment of social equality, nor is
state law always the optimal solution to a problem.2 Less expensive models

for resolv

ingcivildisputesand clarifying
property
rights
may be foundinorganicinstitutional
or alternative
development
disputeresolution.3
Creatingand EnforcingPropertyRights
Economicstudiesrevealtheaccepted
wisdom thatclearlydefinedandenforced
private
property rights to land contributesignificantlyto economic development.4
Anthropologists
and politicalscientists
have also noted the importance
of property
rightstobotheconomicandpoliticaldevelopment.5
Secureproperty
rights
encourage
people to invest in their resources and protect those investments against expropriation.
Scholars have argued thateconomic efficiency requires a clear definition of the rightsof

orenforcement
contract,
and transfer
of land.6
ownership,
Ambiguityinthedefinition
of
any of these rights leads to an increase in transaction costs in the exchange and transfer
of land as well as a residual uncertainty after any land contract.
Economists have argued thatprivatization and defense of the property rightsof the

will increasetheir
poorworldwide
well-being,
givingthemaccess tobusinessand edu
cationalopportunities.7
eco
Articulating
privateproperty
rightsin lawwill facilitate
nomic growth by creating what De Soto calls "meta" property-the paperwork of title
and mortgage thatcan free the surplus value of assets and provide the necessary capital
for economic growth and development. Without this legal frameworkof property rights
people can do business effectively only with those thatknow them or their family.8 It is
estimated that inAfrica more than 50 percent of theperiurban population and 90 percent
of rural areas have informal tenure and thereforehighly insecure and often communal

property
Wider economicopportunities
forthepoor are restricted
due to the
rights.9
absence of contracts and law thatwould enable individuals tomortgage their private

property
anduse thefindsforinvestment.
There is a substantial body of literature suggesting that security of land title leads
to greater investment and increased productivity within and outside of Africa.10 One
suggested benefit of land title is the increased availability of credit. A foundational
study inThailand found thatcreditwas readily available where titlingof land existed.'1
The study confirmed the link between private land ownership and productivity.As

in

much ofAfrica, credit inThailand was nearly impossible for rural landowners to obtain
without the complete legal possession

of land as collateral. The Thailand

study also

found thatnothing short of privatized tenurewould achieve the same effect.However,
two subsequent studies inAfrica discovered thatcreditwas not strongly correlated with
privatized land rights inNiger, Kenya, and Tanzania, because creditwas so limited over
all.12 Providing title to land, in an area where none exists, is an extremely costly endeav
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aregreaterthanthecost.Inother
or,yettheThailandstudyestablishedthatthepayoffs
results
havebeen far
more equivocal.Klaus Deiningersumsup theresearch.
countries
The positiveeffect
of titleon thesupplyof credit
will notemergeuniversally.
Formallandtitling
and
registration...
.aremore likelytohavea strong
credit
marketimpactinsituations
where informal
credit
marketsare alreadyoperational
and a latentdemandexistsforformalcreditthatcannotbe satisfied
becauseof thelackof formaltitle.13

Incentive
to investinlandisanotherlinkbetweeneconomicefficiency
andproper
in landarehighlyvaried.
Most Africanfarmers
tyrights.Investments
engage in some
small-scaleinvestment,
suchas thefertilization
of a fieldwithmanurefromfarmani
mals.Other investments,
suchas theplanting
of fruittrees,
diggingof ditchestochan
nel rain throughfields,and therefurbishment
of farmbuildingsor fences,occur
regularly
withminimalcapitaloutlay.
Withoutsecureproperty
rights,
farmers
will be
on theirland,suchas buildingsor irrigation
unlikelyto investinmajor improvements
evensmallerinvestments,
systems.
Absentsecurityin landrights,
suchas thefertiliza
tionof fields,are less likelytooccur.14
Reduced transaction
costs are thefinaleconomiceffectof secure landrights.
a cleardefinition
of therights
of
Scholarshavearguedthateconomicefficiency
requires
of land.15
and transfer
of anyof these
ownership,
contract,
Ambiguityin thedefinition
rights leads to an increase in transaction costs and a residual uncertainty after any land

costsdue touncertainty
or contract.
have twoconsequences.
transfer
High transaction
is reducedby theelevatedcostof establishing
First,thevalueof anyimmobile
property
clear ownership of the resource. Second, the high costs of exchange also prevent pro

ductiveusers fromobtaining
more land,thusleadingto the inefficient
allocationof
With high transaction
resources.
costs,potentialuserswill be unable to acquire land
either through rental or purchase at thepoint atwhich theycould assure a higher return,
because themarginal product of the owner's use plus transaction costs exceed themar

user.Thus,high transaction
costscan impedethe
ginalproductof themore efficient
efficient
allocationof landwithina society.
Implicitin thesearguments
regarding
theimportance
ofproperty
rightsis thatpri
to
once
vateproperty
land,
are
or
While legisla
rights
established, enforced defended.
tures and judges around theworld can create the laws and regulations that protect

individualpropertyrights,theydo not have theresponsibility
of enforcingthem.
or police
Enforcement
is leftto thecourtsand to the local administrative
structures
forcesacrossthecountry.
InNorthAmerica,Europe,andotherareaswith strongstatesand sufficient
fund
ina predictablefashion.In theseplaces
decisionslead toenforcement
ing,legislative
arecomparatively
localadministrations
legaldictaareclearlycommunicated,
efficient,
are accountableforimplementation.
and local authorities
Gary Libecap has noted:
"With title, thepolice power of the state can enforce private property rights to land. The
courts can issue eviction notices against trespassers or arbitrate boundary disputes, and
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lawenforcement
officialscan implement
courtorders."16
This statement
reflectsthe
will be enforcedthrough
assumption
made bymany scholarsthatlegislative
decisions
out a country by states that have effective control over the entirety of their territory.
this assumption may be true inNorth America, Australia, and Europe, it is not so
inmuch of theworld. Not only are the assumptions of enforcement false, they lead to

While

thatfocuson lawmaking,
seriously
misplacedpolicy initiatives
while neglectingthe
problems of law enforcement or implementation. In the absence of a strong local admin

istrativestructure,enforcement
of laws regardingpropertyis far less certain.
Developmentof newproperty
law is a necessarybut insufficient
conditionforinstitu
tionalchangeinproperty
rights.
of theproperty
Accordingto thereasoning
rightsschool,thebest thingforthose
countries seeking to increase their economic growth rates and fully benefit from the

would be tomake everyefforttodefineprivateproperty
globalizedeconomy
rights
clearly and establish the institutions for the creation of meta property, such as effective
titlingof customary or informally held lands.

mortgage arrangements and accessible

However, Douglass North argues thatchanging the formal rules of a society, such as the
definition of property rights, is an incremental process that is constrained by the past.
Vested interests inprevious institutions see change as a threat to their survival and limit

of therulesof
thedevelopment
Theorythusdemandsa reconstruction
of new rules.17
the game, while at the same time urging caution when discussing any grand changes

Criticaltothistheoretical
disconnectis theprob
designedtoalterinstitutions
radically.
lem of time.Organic property rights change occurs over timemarked in decades rather

thanyears.'8Governments
may change lawquickly,but implementation
of the legal
changes is a much longer process in underresourced states.
to these issues is the challenge of institutional capacity. Given the lack of
resources of governments across the developing world, property rights changes are dif
ficult to achieve even when supported by the executive, bureaucracy, and other neces
Added

sary organizations. The effectiveness of municipal administrations in rural areas far
from the center of power has been questioned in relation to the state, development, and
public administration inAfrica.19 Given thedubious capacity of local governance across
much ofAfrica, it is revealing to examine where and forwhom laws are enforced and to
what degree local administrative structures influence the implementation of changes in

property
rights.

Land Tenure inUganda
There were several significant problems with Uganda's

land tenure system that created

a poor environment foreconomic growth and agricultural development. Prior to the col
onization of Uganda

theBaganda

kingdom controlled much of the territoryof central

Uganda.20 The British defeated the kingdom in 1894 and occupied the entiretyof what
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isnowUganda.However,giventheBritishcolonialpolicyof indirect
rule,wherebythe
ofcolonieswas conductedthrough
administration
indigenous
leaders,theBritishsought
was
thesupport
of theBagandanking(theKabaka) andBagandanelites.This support
which allocated land to indigenous
arrangedthroughthe1900Buganda agreement,
thelandtosecuredtenancy.
This system,
notablesand relegatedthosefarming
referred
toasmailo, required
peasantfarmers
topayyearlyrentstoabsenteelandlords.
Yet the
of tenants
was notalwaysassured,and trouble
with thesystem
compliance
beganduring
thecolonialera.Afterindependence,
theissueof thestatusof tenants
onmailo landwas
raisedagain.2'
In 1975, inan effort
todealwith theseproblems,IdiAmin implemented
theLand
ReformDecree,whichdeclaredall thelandinUganda tobe publicproperty
underthe
thecentralgovernment.
The 1975Land
controlof districtlandboardsand ultimately
intofixed-term
Reform
Decree turned
the
mailo landcertificates
leasesfromthecentral
onmailo land,the
While thischangeprovidedfurther
government.
securityto tenants
landlordswere unhappy with it. Itwas one of several issues from the colonial era and the

thatled toconfusion
overproperty
yearsof dictatorship
rightsthathad tobe addressed
inanynew land law.However,civilconflict
precludedanymajor changeinproperty
rights
untilthe1990s.
tomost ofUganda,
AfterYoweriMuseveni tookpowerin 1986,stability
returned
ofproperty
foraddressing
Priorities
and thepoliticalspaceopenedfora revision
rights.
out field
problemsof landtenureinUgandawere formulated
by researchers
carrying
surveystodeterminethenecessarychanges inUganda's landholding
system.
These
studies resulted in several goals for land reform inUganda.

First, the land reform sys

to theeconomicdevelopment
temshouldcontribute
of agriculture
andof thenation.
Second, the land tenure system should be flexible in the transferof land so that farmers
most capable of using the land profitably would be able to obtain it.Third, the land

tenure
systemshouldprotectaccess tolandforpeoplewho haveno income-earning
pos
theevo
sibilities
outsidetheagricultural
sector.
Fourth,landtenurelawshouldfacilitate
lutionof land tenuretowarda single,uniform,and efficientsystemforthewhole
reforms
studiesestablishedthegroundwork
These important
forconstitutional
nation.22
to landholding.
The 1995Constitution
The constitution
divergedfromthe1975Land ReformDecree,whichhad vestedall
ofUganda,bydeclaringthatall landbelongedto
landholding
rightsinthegovernment
the citizens of Uganda.

In Chapter 15 of theUgandan

constitution, four different cate

andmailo
were established:
goriesof landtenure
customary
tenure,
leasehold,freehold,
land.
468
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The constitution
called forthecreation
of a new lawthat
would recognizetherights
of tenure.
This changefurthered
the
ofbona fideoccupantsofmailo landwith security
uncertainty
regarding
mailo land.Towhomdid thelandbelong?
Whatwere thespecif
ifany,of thelandlords?
ic rights
of thetenants?
Whatwere therights,
The constitution
theproperty
of thoseholdingtheirlandson a
also raiseduncertainties
regarding
rights
were guaranteedsecurity
of
customary
basis. Farmerswith customarylandholding
tenure
byArticle237 (4): "a) allUganda citizensowninglandundercustomary
tenure
ofownership
inamannerprescribed
may acquirecertificates
byParliament;
andb) land
tenure
to freeholdlandownership
undercustomary
may be converted
by registration."
While theprovisionof therightof registration
and freeholdto thoseowningland
of
through
customarylandtenuresystems
was wholly inkeepingwith extanttheories
andconverting
property,
landwerenot inplace,norwere
the
mechanismsforregistering
theyarticulatedin theconstitution.
Moreover, laws and regulationsregardingthe
of leases,particularly
forforeigners,
exchangeof landand thelength
foreign-owned
were also unclear.23
These uncertainties
ensuredthatthe
businesses,and corporations,
creation of a new land law was dictated not just by constitutional decree, but also by

of tenureand theeconomicimperative
grass-roots
demandforsecurity
of a country
seekingrapidgrowth.
inthearticula
One finalaspectof the1995 constitution
would become important
of theLandAct of 1998: theissueofharmfultraditional
tionand implementation
prac
tices,particularly
as theyapplied towomen. InArticle26 of theconstitution,
every
citizenofUganda isgiventherighttoownproperty.
Article33 specifically
addresses
therights
ofwomen,accordingthem"fulland equal dignity
of theperson"withmen
andprohibiting
customsor traditions
whichareagainstthedignity,
wel
"laws,cultures,
fareor interest
ofwomenorwhichundermine
theirstatus."24
These constitutional
guar
antees were taken quite seriously by Uganda's

female parliamentarians and leaders.25

of equalityunderthelawandrecognition
thatthere
were
Theywere thefirst
expression
were harmfultowomen.Due toextensiveandwell-publicized
existingpracticesthat
constitutional
discussions,
manyUgandan citizens,particularly
women,weremade
womenwerewell-represented
in the
awareof theirconstitutional
rights.
Additionally,
of theconstitution.
Women lawyersservedon theconstitutional
drafting
commission;
women'sorganizations
submitted
opinions;and 18percentofmembersof theconstitu
The result
of all thisparticipation
that
tionalassembly
werewomen.26
was a constitution
was extremely
progressive
with regardtowomen'srights
andan educatedconstituency
ofwomen'sactivists.

The Land Act of 1998
After the constitution created a parliamentary mandate fora new land law, the specifics
of that law were met with great public interest.The parliamentary debate on theLand
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Act was vigorous, inciting such great controversy that at one point the government

fearedcivilunrest.27
The Land Act of 1998 brought about a transformationof the titling,dispute resolu
tion systems, and basic land law forUganda. The law created a mechanism

for custom

ary land to be formally recognized and then titled. It captured contemporary economic
thought regarding private property rights, insofar as therewas a clear focus on creating

security
and titledfreehold
where ithadnotexistedpreviously.
Therewas alsoprovision
for the creation of formalized customary tenure and the eventual transitionof customary
tenure to titled freehold. In addition to thepotential for the titlingof customary land, the

LandAct also soughtto increasetenuresecurity
byprovidinglegalrights
of occupancy
to squatters. The Land Act recognized as a "bona fide occupant" anyone who "had occu
pied and utilized or developed any land unchallenged by the registered owner or agent
of the registered owner for twelve years or more." This provision had the effect of giv
ing security of tenure even to those resident on land thatwas not theirown.28
In theLand Act women were awarded the right to challenge theirhusbands if they
attempted to sell the land on which thewives resided, throughwhat is referred to as "the
consent clause." However, an amendment to the act,which would have given women the
right to co-ownership of family land,was eliminated from the final version under dubi
ous circumstances. The government promised that the issue of co-ownership would be
raised again in theDomestic Relations Bill, but thispremise has yet to be fulfilled and
its fulfillmentdoes not appear likely in the future.29Instead, some of the protections of
thirdparty rights (those of dependent children) to land thatwere present in the 1998
Land Act were retractedwhen itwas amended in 2004.30

The 1998 Land Act clearlyembracedthe individualized
property
model. In so

doing, it allowed for the creation of meta property that can be mortgaged and trans
ferred,bequeathed, and exchanged.3' The provisions of the Land Act correspond with
the theoryof property rights in that themechanisms to facilitate exchange, rental,mort
gage and dispute resolution in relation to land are clearly articulated and applied to all
of themajor formsof landholding inUganda. Moreover, thevoluntary nature of the reg
istrationand titlingprocess forcustomary land demonstrated an awareness of the failure
ofmandatory titling inneighboring states, such as Kenya, and the differences indemand
for land and for titleacross regions of Uganda.32 The titlingmechanisms in theLand Act
have thepotential to, over time and in a voluntary manner, draw all land inUganda

into

titledsphere.
theformal,

Implementing

the Land Act

a law and getting itpassed by a legislature are only thebeginning of theprocess
of institutional change. Implementing and enforcing the changes thatare required under
a newly written law are a difficult and lengthyprocess, particularly in countries where

Making
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resourcesat the local levelare not sufficient
forthetasksof administration.
In the
in
States,
as
many
once
the
United
otherdevelopedcountries,
legislature
passes a law,
theappropriate
implementation
andenforcement
andarecapableof
bodiesare informed
For example,iftheU.S. SupremeCourtdecides tochange
takingactionimmediately.
thecriteriaforlawfulsearchesbypoliceofficers,
once thedecisionismade public,the
thestreets
are informed
a variety
policepatrolling
through
ofprocesses.Theywill like
lybemade awareof thelawthrough
theirlocalstate'sattorney,
district
orcoun
attorney,
tyattorney.
Regional law officers'associationssend out dailybulletinsby email
updatingchiefsofpoliceon legaldecisionsthat
mightaffectthem.
Websitesandpubli
cationstargeted
at theofficers
on thestreetthatdiscusslegalchangesand their
on
affect
and educationforofficers.
policebehaviorprovideadditionalinformation
Thus, there
arewell-developed
mechanismsbothtopass information
alongto thepeoplewhomost
need itand toensurethattheyareheldaccountableforknowingaboutlegalchanges.In
manydevelopedcountries,
then,themakingof a new law is a sufficient
conditionfor
muchof theworldwheretheorganiza
institutional
change.It isnotenoughthroughout
in lawand
tionalcapacityand theresources
necessarytoconveyfactsaboutalterations
in
necessarychanges policeor judicialbehaviorrapidlyandaccurately
areabsent.The
in changingproperty
enforcement
of theLandAct illuminates
thedifficulties
rights
toachievegreatereconomicgrowthinchalleng
institutions
law inan attempt
through
of thestateare limited.
ingsettings
wheretheresources
Inordertoassess theimplementation
and impact
of theLandAct,pairedcase stud
ieswere conducted inTororo andMbarara

inUganda

in 2005 and 2006. These two areas

represent
verydifferent
regionsof thecountry.
Tororo is in thefarwesternpartof
Uganda

in an area populated by the Japadhola and Teso with a mix of ethnic groups in

of 329 peopleper squarekilo
theurbanareas.Tororodistrict
has a populationdensity
meter, with some commercial farming projects as well as subsistence farming and the

andpoor.Land inthearea is
TororoCementFactory.33
Tororoispoliticallyinsignificant
In thetownslandis leased
held through
customary,
communaltenureinthecountryside.
on a long and short termbasis and can be purchased as freehold. It is possible to lease
customary land in the rural areas.

cor
Mbarara is located
withinthepastoralist
corridorthatrunsfromthenorthwest

ner of Uganda

through to the southwest. The people around Mbarara are Banyankole
with a greatermix of ethnic groups in the towns. Land in the area around Mbarara has

on an individual
traditionally
beenheld through
customary
tenure
basis. In thecountry
sidepeoplepracticesubsistence
andsomepastoralism.
agriculture
Population
densityin
Mbarara districtis 112 people per square kilometer.34
Because PresidentYoweri
hails fromMbarara, it is often noted as particularlywell-resourced in termsof
local administration and governance. Tororo andMbarara were chosen as study sites to

Museveni

examineareasof thecountry
with verydifferent
administrative
capabilities.In each
wereconducted
withofficials
interviews
region,structured
workinginthelocal landtri
and thepolice to
bunals, landboard offices,local nongovernmental
organizations,
471
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determine the degree towhich theLand Act had been implemented, the nature of dis
putes in the area, and theproblems of implementation. Interviews with people pursuing
land disputes were conducted in both areas. In Tororo a local nongovernmental organi
zation facilitated a focus group with women

to discuss the consent clause. Officials

from theMinistry of Lands, Water, and theEnvironment were interviewed inKampala,
as were representatives fromwomen's organizations and nongovernmental organiza

thirty
inter
Approximately
with theLandAct and itsimplementation.
tionsconcerned

views and one focus group were conducted overall. Statistics were gathered from the
land tribunals regarding thenature of cases heard, the time fora case tomove from com

of complaints
filed.
and thenumber
plainttoresolution,
Change
TrackingInstitutional
From the time theLand Act was written, itwas clear that therewould be difficulties with

factionsin thegovernment
As thebillwas beingdebated,interested
implementation.35
bureaucracy, particularly theDirectorate of Lands and Environment, a subunit of the
Ministry ofWater, Lands, and Environment, took up positions toweaken the reforms
made and maintain the centrality of theirorganization. PatrickMcAuslan, who partici
pated inwriting the Land Act, recounted the specifics of this obstructionist behavior.

for
therecommendations
delayedinstituting
ofLands andEnvironment
TheDirectorate
implementing theLand Act and fought itsown marginalization.36 It previously had con
trolled funds thatunder theLand Act are allocated to the districts in order to finance the
activities of the district land boards. When the directorate ceased to control themoney
allocated to the administration of land, it declined in importance. Therefore, it tried to
redirect revenue to the institutions created by theLand Act thatwere under its control,
such as the land fund,which was intended to provide compensation to those that lost

theirlandtostateappropriation.37
to institution
ispreciselythekindof impediment
obstructionism
This bureaucratic
al change thatNorth identified. North noted that "dominant organizations (and their
entrepreneurs) may view the necessary changes as a threat to their survival. To the
degree that the entrepreneurs of such organizations control decision making

they can

were additionalproblemsof imple
However,there
thwartthenecessarychanges."38

mentation thatquickly became evident.Many of these can be captured under the rubric
of a lack of capacity.
With all of the new institutionsand tribunals created for the administration of land
inUganda,

itwas estimated thatan extra 20,000 trained administrative personnel would

be needed to staff the differentbodies created by the bill.39 The difficulty in finding
trainedpersonnel was perhaps even more acute inUganda than in other countries due to
the effects of AIDS deaths on theworking-age population. Tied to the issue of capacity
was thatof funding.Creating thenew land offices and land tribunals required addition
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almonetaryresources,
but theLandActmade no specificprovisionsforthisfunding.
Despite thefactthattheLandActwas passed in1998,by2000 there
wereno function
ingtribunals,
and severalpeoplewerekilled in increasing
violenceoverlanddisputes,
In
perhapsas a resultof theabsenceof government
disputesettlement
mechanisms.40
Tororo the land board was established and staffedonly in 2006. InMbarara

the land tri

bunalwas established
much earlierin2001,but itdidnothearcases until2003 due to
logistical
problemsingetting
desks,furniture,
and files.
Thoughthelandtribunals
arenow inplace throughout
thecountry,
thereare still
problemswith dispensingsalarypaymentsto them.In somedistrictland tribunals,
to
money forsalariesand expensescanbe up to twomonthslate,forcing
thetribunals
in
and
the
of
ceasehearingcases.41
Lapses
delays
implementationanymajor changeare
to be expected. What

is important to note in this case is that eight years after theLand

Actwas passedby thelegislature
theproblemsof capacitypersist.InMbarara thedis
trictlandtribunal
meetsonce amonth,inTororolessoftendue toa lackof resources.
Even

in the capital city of Kampala

the district land tribunalmeets only two days a

month,regardless
of complaintsfiled.42
of thenumber
in implementing
to thedifficulties
also contributes
Corruption
major institutional
In
the
is
for
its
and the
government
infamous
change. Uganda
bureaucracy
corruption
additional"fees"thatarenecessarytoobtainproperdocumentation
of landownership
or landtransfer,
unlessone iswilling towait yearsforaccess toa certificate
of title.43
ofcitizencomplaints
Therearemultipleinstances
regarding
delaysofup tofiveyearsin
thetitling
of landor requestsforbribesfrom
bureaucrats
responsible
forfilingthetitle.
andallocationofmultipletitlestothesame
Therearescandalousexamplesof landtheft
plot.Inonehighprofilecase, theKampala citycouncilwas accusedofobtainingtitleto
case led
landonwhichpublicschoolswerebuilt,thensellingthatland.This particular
to a public statement by theminister of local government that anyone dealing with the
Kampala city council does so "at his or her own risk."44These problems aremore per
vasive in areas where the demand for land is greater, such as highly populated or urban

While thissortof corruption
existsinsuchan important
the
areas.
government
ministry,
economic benefits anticipated from thenew Land Act are unlikely tomaterialize. Such

TororoorMbarara,where
werenotpresentineither
egregiousexamplesof corruption
landvalueswere lower,althoughpeople inbothareas complainedof longdelays in
titlesfromthecentralgovernment,
unlessonewas willingtopaya bribe.
receiving
andpracticesof different
ethnicgroups,
Customarylaw,theuncodifiedtraditions
still governs the allocation and inheritance of customary land inmuch of the country
outside the capital city. InMbarara

land is held on a customary basis in individualized

plots,so themovementtowardsindividualized
privatetenureisnotas sharpa disjunc
ture as it is inTororo and other areas of the countrywhere customary land is commu
nally held by a lineage. In both areas the Land Act has been most controversial in its

efforts
torecognizetheproperty
ofwomen.Customarylawchallengestheletter
rights
and the intentof both the constitution and theLand Act, as it interfereswith the formal
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law,
men ownor control
rights
ofwomen.Undercustomary
recognition
of theproperty
land.Women may farm the land, but theyare allowed access to itonly through their rela

tionships
withmen.45
Martin Chanock and others have noted thatolder men, empowered by the coloniza

of customary
customary
lawduringthecolonialera.46
The creation
tionprocess,formed
rights.
This issue iseconomically
lawexcludedwomen'svoices andwomen'sproperty
significant across most of theAfrican continentwhere women are engaged inboth pro
duction and reproduction.47 Indeed,African women are farmers, and it is their responsi
bility to feed their families. Their access to land and other formsof property is therefore
extremely important for economic development. Formalization of customary law in the
name of itsowner is done in thename of thehousehold head, who ismale. This process
limitswomen's use rights to the land thatare present under customary law.To the extent
thatcustomary law excludes women fromownership of land and other forms of proper
ty,italso impedes theiraccess to capital.
In rural communities, the clan will
land to theman upon his marriage. The matrimonial home is usually built on cus
tomary land and is regarded as the husband's property until he dies, at which time ownership reverts to

According

to custom, females marry into the clans of their husband.

allocate customary

rulessystematically
excludefemalesfromtheclanor communalentity,
theclan.Because customary
they also exclude

females from ownership of land. Moreover,

since women

are seen as belonging

to

toown land.As
normaritalclans,theyaredeniedbybothsourcestheopportunity
neithertheirfamilies
childhoodtowidowhood.48
a result,theyarealienatedfromlandownershipfrom
The constitution gives women equal access to landwith men and forbids discrimi
nation. Article 33.4 of the constitution says: "Women shall have the right to equal treat
ment with men and that right shall include equal opportunities in political, economic
and social activities." Not surprisingly, in practice women do not enjoy equality.
Under the constitution women are granted rights to land that they did not have
under customary law.Women now have the right to act on theirown behalf in purchas
ing, transferring,and bequeathing land as theywish and in representing themselves and
their property interests in court. However, few women are able to take advantage of

described
thesenewproperty
rights.
Given thenatureofmaritaleconomicrelationships
above, specifically the belief that all marital property belongs to the husband, few
women have the resources to purchase land in theirown name.49
The dilemma forwomen comes through the recognition of customary land tenure
in the constitution and theLand Act without the implementation of joint ownership of
marital property (the clause that did not make it into the final document). Under cus
tomary land tenure arrangements, no woman has the right to ownership of customary
land either through inheritance or through joint ownership of marital property. By rec

ofmaritalproperty,
the
withoutprovidingforco-ownership
tenure,
ognizingcustomary

Land Act violates women's constitutional rights to equality.
Article 27 of the Constitution protects the right of women, but it is very difficult for rural women to
invoke the constitution in terms of her right to inherit land. In effect they are saying thatwomen can
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continuetoinherit
law.
won't inherit,
and so itstaking
us back
landundercustomary
Whichmeans they
towherewe started.50

However,theLandAct does protect
women's rightto liveon and farm"familyland,"
whetherit is customary
Themaritalconsentclause preventsone spouse
or freehold.
fromsellingthe"landonwhich issituatedtheordinary
of thefamily
andfrom
residence
which thefamily
derivesustenance"
withouttheapprovalof theother.51
The controversy
surrounding
themaritalconsentclausegivesan indication
of the
ofwomen'sproperty
inblockingtheir
Women facedifficulty
sensitivity
rightsissues.52
husbands' sale of residential property if they are not aware of their rights or are not

legally
married.
Manywomenhavecustomary
marriages;forthesetobe recognized
by
law,thebridepricemustbe fullypaid.53
Evidence froma 2006 survey
of 2,227house
holds intwenty
districts
ofUganda that
was conducted
byAssociates forDevelopment
and theCentre forBasic Research shows thatconsent isbeing sought by spouses inmost
areas of the country.The percentage of respondents who sold land and did not obtain
spousal consent was 26 percent in theNorth, 14 percent in theEast, the area of the coun
try inwhich Tororo can be found, 8 percent in theCentral area where Mbarara

is locat

ed, and 10 percent in theWest.54

Because of thedemandforlegislation
women'sproperty
protecting
rights,
coupled
with theeducationalefforts
ofwomen's organizations,
theconsentclause has been
implemented
more quicklythanotherinstitutional
Yet recognition
innovations.
of cus
tomarylandtenurein theconstitution
and theLandAct is stillat oddswith constitu
tionalguarantees
When itcomes to theownership
of genderequality.
and controlof
property,
customarylawand equalityof citizenship
are incompatible.
Because of the
womenare increasingly
awareof theirrights.
of constitutional
publicnature
discussions,
somewomenhave lodgedcases over landwith thelocal landtribunals
Consequently,
based on the constitution. InMbarara District, there are instances of women who have
been married for fortyyears ormore going to the land tribunals and trying,unsuccess
fully,to gain a piece of the land of theirnatal familybased on theirconstitutional rights

of equality.55
mostwomen'sefforts
toachievecon
Bikaako andSsenkumbaarguethat
trolof landthrough
thecourtsinUganda are frustrated.56
Yet thechoiceof these
women
to go to court to pursue these issues suggests that they are aware of theirconstitutional

rights
andunafraid
of engagingbureaucratic
processesto trytoachievethem.
Conclusion:LinkingTheoryand Practice
HernandoDe Soto recognizedthatthere
in implementing
new
mightbe difficulties
property
rightsforthepoor.He indicatedthattheproblem
would liewith thelawyers
try to block any reform in order to protect the status quo from "extralegal
or
behavior
large scale change."57 Lawyers who are resistant to economic reformsmay

who would
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be problematic in other contexts; inUganda

the barriers to change have been entirely

different.
Controversy over theLand Act arose because

some thought ithad gone too far in

changing land rights and others that it had not gone far enough. These
focused on women's

arguments

land rights, rather thanprivatization, and the repeated calls for fur

ther reform are indicative of demands that go radically beyond what has already been
enacted. Although theLand Act provides the legal basis for the award of titles and the

thesechangeshaveonly
ofdisputes,thebureaucracies
thatshouldfacilitate
adjudication
andhaveoftenoperated
withoutappropriate
staffing
or funding.
slowlybeenestablished
theeffectiveness
of thenew titling
has undermined
mechanismsarticulated
Corruption
in the law. This has slowed the process of titling customary landholding as well as the
transferor titlingof freehold, so much so that according to theUganda Land Alliance
eight years after the implementation of theLand Act not one plot of customary landwas

This slownessinimplementation
iswhateconomictheory
wouldpredictis like
titled.58
ly to occur when radical shifts in land rights are legislated from the center.North has

argued that,"institutional change is incremental, gradual and constrained by the histor

The LandAct and theconstitution
icalpast."59
were necessarybutnotsufficient
condi
tionsforinstitutional
change.
One aspect of the past that interfereswith the new articulation of rights inUganda
is customary law, specifically as it relates towomen and what theycan and can not own.

why
"Property
cannotownproperty"
isan oft-repeated
aphorisminUganda describing
women can not own their own land.60 It also sheds light on cultural practices at odds
with women's constitutional rights.Customary law inUganda defines the past institu
tional structures relating to land allocation inUganda, and it recognizes women as labor

orproperty.61

The recent changes in theproperty law of Uganda have been an effortto achieve the
gains fromprivate individualized tenure.The injunction articulated by De Soto and oth
ers to recognize and privatize formally the property rights that already exist informally
must be weighed carefully against theunderstanding thatallocation of property rights to
male heads of household without a legal framework for the joint ownership of property
may be exclusionary inways damaging to economic growth and contrary to concepts of
it is particularly interesting that theone aspect of theLand Act that
specifically tries to protect women's use rights to property, the spousal consent clause,
has been implemented across the country, as a result of strong demand frombelow cou
justice. Nevertheless,

pled with an array of civil society organizations that carefullymonitored its implemen

tation.
The Land Act has not yet been fully implemented and enforced inUganda.

It has

not yet been an effective instrument in the formalization of property rights.The neces
sity of law in changing property rights can not be disregarded, but it is not the end goal
in developing countries that itmight be in the industrialized world. It is a beginning.
Injecting a realistic representation of both time and process into discussions of institu
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ingraspingamore completeunderstanding
of how change
tionalchangeis imperative
ofwhateconomistssayregarding
occursandwhen itis likelytobe impeded.In light
the
timing
and thedifficulty
of changing
property
thefailure
of law tobe an effec
rights,
tivetoolof economictransformation
seems tobe a matterof excessivelyoptimistic
expectations.
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